Ontological materialism, in its various forms, has become the orthodox view in contemporary philosophy of mind. This book provides a variety of defenses of mind-body dualism, and shows (explicitly or implicitly) that a thoroughgoing ontological materialism cannot be sustained. The contributions are intended to show that, at the very least, ontological dualism (as contrasted with a dualism that is merely linguistic or epistemic) constitutes a philosophically respectable alternative to the monistic views that currently dominate thought about the mind-body (or, perhaps more appropriately, person-body) relation.
About the Author
Andrea Lavazza is a research fellow at the Centro Universitario Internazionale, Italy.
Howard Robinson is CEU Provost/Academic Pro-Rector of the Central European University, Hungary and Professor of Philosophy and Honorary Research Fellow at the University of Liverpool, UK.
Series:Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy (Book 54)